As a kid in the late 1970s I idolised footballer Ossie
Ardiles - a hero of the 1978 World Cup winning Argentina team. I remember his first appearance on British soil, taking to the pitch to a Buenos Aires style tickertape welcome in front of 48,000 boisterous fans. Football was my passion and Ossie was my inspiration - a
huge poster of the enigmatic Argentinian enjoyed pride of place on my bedroom
wall. Then, in 1982,
having just completed my army basic training, war broke out between Britain and
Argentina and I found myself on the opposite side to my footballing hero’s
cousin, a
young air-force lieutenant called José Ardiles. It was a war that took the young lieutenant’s life. It was a war that saw
17-year-old British soldiers pitched into trench warfare, fighting with
bayonets, knives and even bare hands; bitter ‘gutter fighting’ that had more in
common with a medieval brawl than a twentieth century conflict. It all seemed
absurd. It still does.
.
For those who fought in the conflict there were no
winners and losers – both sides exposed to war’s long-lasting and sometimes
life-changing effects. What did it achieve? For a start it helped bring down a ruthless
dictatorship: some 12,000 people are officially listed as having been murdered
by the regime that ruled Argentina from 1976 to 1983 and thousands more are
still among the ‘disappeared’. Following the fall of the Galtieri regime after the 1982 conflict,
successive Argentine governments recognised the importance of the friendship
with an old ally and, without formally revoking their claim on the disputed
Falkland islands/Las islas Malvinas, Argentina got on with improving relations, both with the islanders and
with the UK. Reconciliation was swift. Argentine visitors returned to the
islands, accords were signed on fisheries and oil exploration and, by 1994,
Argentine and British soldiers were serving together in Cyprus. Argentina and Britain had enjoyed 150 years of excellent relations and ten
weeks of war. It was only natural that things should get back to the way they
were. In the mid-nineties there was plenty of optimism that a permanent
solution to the sovereignty dispute would be found, a fitting tribute to all
those who lost their lives in the 1982 conflict. They
didn’t die in vain: peace would be their legacy.
.
Thirty
three years on and that legacy is under threat. Britain is set to deploy extra
Chinook helicopters and a new surface-to-air missile system to the Falkland
Islands, amid fears Russia could be arming the Argentine government. We hear
the same sabre-rattling rhetoric that preceded the hostilities three decades
ago. And there’s the same political deadlock. As
long as the issue remains a potential source of political capital in both
Argentina and Britain, a mutually acceptable negotiated agreement seems
unlikely.
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The hardline approach taken by the British government towards any negotiation on sovereignty is fuelled by the fact that the 1982 conflict cost 255 British lives, as well as the
lives of three islanders, with many more bearing the scars of war – physical
and psychological. It’s a rigid stance matched by Buenos Aires (649 Argentines
losing their lives in the war). It’s a bitter irony that the 1982 war, far from
helping resolve the matter, has only served to complicate the issue further.
There are strong and passionate sovereignty arguments on both sides, and, of course, the islanders have a right to be considered. But such
rights have rarely taken precedence over political reality in post-colonial
clean-ups. When Diego Garcia was handed over to the US in 1973, the residents
were relocated without any consultation on self-determination. However, self-determination, the
basis for which Britain rejects talks on sovereignty on the Falkland Islands, might
well be the key to progress not the obstacle; Argentina should be looking to
win the islanders over, forging links with them
instead of isolating them. Any growth in the
Falklands economy, whether through oil, tourism or fisheries, ought to have a
knock-on benefit for its neighbour.
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When the crisis in the South Atlantic erupted in 1982, most British people
had to reach for an atlas. It was the military intervention that put the
Falkland Islands on the map. Had Argentina stayed on its original path of
establishing relations with the islanders and conducting low-level sovereignty
talks with London instead of initiating military action, it’s quite possible
there would have been an agreement by now and the Falkland Islands would be as
hard to pick out on a map as Diego Garcia.
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The human cost of the 1982 conflict should not be allowed to become a further obstacle to a peaceful solution. The far-reaching effects of war have touched the lives of many ordinary Argentines in the same way they have affected many British families. For Argentine veterans there is also a sense of injustice as well dealing with the aftermath of the war. It's perhaps why the islands have come to mean so much more to the people of Argentina. They need to know their loved ones didn't die for nothing. Only when the issue is resolved can we say that all those who perished in the 1982 conflict didn't die in vain. We owe it to those who lost their lives in the fighting (not to mention those who returned from the war but still suffer the consequences) to find a way forward, not start another war. We owe them that much.